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Abstract 
Recent financial crises highlight weaknesses in financial markets and the need for regulatory and 
supervisory bodies (RSB) to improve the stability of financial markets. Currently, international 
institutions like the IMF and the World Bank place the independent RSB among their principle policy 
recommendations to developing countries. This paper acknowledges the importance of independent 
RSB for the proper functioning of financial markets. However, this paper also points out the 
preconditions to establish independent RSB. Unless certain prerequisites are satisfied, policy 
recommendations to construct an independent RSB are doomed to fail.  The recent Turkish experience 
is provided as a case study to elucidate this conclusion. This paper first presents the arguments for 
independent RSB and the policy recommendations in institution building for stronger financial system. 
Then, the background of Turkish experience for independent RSB is provided.  Finally, we analyze the 
primary reasons for the deficient performance of Turkish RSB over the last five years in an attempt to 
provide actual lessons for the future institutional reforms.   
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Assessing the Preconditions in Establishing an Independent Regulatory and 
Supervisory Agency in Globalized Financial Markets: The Case of Turkey  
 
I. Introduction 
 Turkey has experienced recurrent crises in 1994, 2000 and 2001. Weaknesses 
in Turkish financial markets have constituted the major reason behind these twin-
crisis episodes. Hence, these recent crises in Turkey have elucidated the importance of 
well-functioning financial system for the macroeconomic stability. East Asian crisis 
in 1997 has also highlighted the same issue in a more global environment. In the East 
Asian crisis, deficiencies in financial markets of these countries have emerged as an 
instrumental domestic reason for the crisis in addition to international factors related 
to the functioning of international markets like contagion. In addition to these well-
known cases, many developing countries have either experienced the financial market 
crises or come very close to economic turmoils stemming from the problems in 
financial markets especially with the escalating liberalization and globalization of 
financial markets in the recent decades.     
These observations have also motivated the international institutions to 
concentrate more on weaknesses in domestic financial markets*. In May 1999, both 
IMF and the World Bank launched a joint mission related to the IMF’s surveillance 
system and the World Bank’s financial sector development program. This joint 
program is denoted as Financial Sector Assessment Program. The main objectives of 
this collaboration are to enhance resource utilization of these institutions, to reduce 
                                                 
* There seems to be less concrete steps taken to deal with the problems associated with the functioning 
of international financial markets like rational panics and contagions which are very much related to 
short term capital flows in international financial markets.  
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multiplicative work that is conducted by both institutions, to ensure consistency of 
policy advice of both institutions, and finally to enhance legitimacy of their programs.  
Regulation and supervision of financial markets arises as a focal issue in this 
initiative due to the importance of timely regulation and supervision to fix the 
deficiencies in the financial markets and to avoid experiencing recurrent financial 
crises.  The increasing concern for healthy regulation and supervision of domestic 
financial markets reflects itself in the policy recommendations of the international 
institutions especially after the crises. Turkey is not an exception. Turkish 
governments after the latest crises have been confronted with the detailed policy 
recommendations by the IMF to establish a sound and independent regulatory and 
supervisory institution to control the banking sector in Turkey.  Under strict 
guidelines of the IMF, Turkey has taken major steps to establish an independent 
regulatory and supervisory agency responsible for regulating the banking sector in 
Turkey. Finally, Turkey has set up an independent authority which is referred as 
Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA). In spite of a certain degree of 
success, Turkish experience in forming an independent authority to regulate the 
financial markets has shown that certain preconditions need to be satisfied before 
establishing a new institution in a top-down manner.  
We analyze the evolution of the BRSA starting from its establishment stage to 
the present. Turkey fails to generate necessary conditions for the functioning of an 
independent and strong BRSA. We explain these conditions under nine categories. 
First, the status-quo bias in favor of traditional modes of governance constrains the 
BRSA to involve in necessary reforms in Turkish banking sector. This bias leaves the 
BRSA without political support against the interest groups in Turkish financial 
system. High concentration ratio in Turkish banking sectors also arises as a major 
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challenge for the independent operations of BRSA.  A small number of state-owned 
banks and private banks comprise a major share of Turkish banking sector. The 
existence of big state-owned banks restrains the actions of BRSA by rendering 
political influence on its policy decisions. Similarly, big Turkish banks opt to lobby 
for political influence on the BRSA when their interests are threatened by the 
decisions of the BRSA. 
Some of the reasons for the failure of effective and independent BRSA are 
attributable to the initial organizational structure of BRSA. When the BRSA has been 
founded, various employee groups with conflicting organizational backgrounds have 
been assigned to the BRSA. The clash of organizational mentality of these various 
employee groups appears to be preventing the efficient functioning of BRSA. This 
conflict also reflects itself as a lack of budgetary independence for the BRSA. 
Moreover, the Turkish laws impose restrictions on the BRSA’s board members not to 
work for the private banks after the terminations of their positions. These limitations 
deter the qualified personnel to undertake upper level responsibilities by considering 
their prospective financial losses in the future. This incentive structure, however, 
exposes the board members to even more political influence considering that the 
political domain remains to be the only option after the termination of their terms at 
the office. The BRSA also suffers from the lack of well-defined rules which enhance 
the accountability and transparency of the BRSA and hence provide a safer 
environment for the BRSA officials.  
Others reasons for the failure of BRSA in effectively regulating the banking 
sector can be only tackled at the macro level. For example, lack of regulatory 
forbearance has led to confusions about the decisions of BRSA over the last five years 
and undermined the independent and efficient functioning of the BRSA. Tough 
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decisions of the BRSA have led the many employees in financial sector to lose their 
jobs. This result has compounded with the lack of well defined accountability of 
BRSA and in turn led to mounting pressure from the public against the actions of 
BRSA. Finally, conflicting and strict policy recommendations of the IMF have 
constrained the flexibility and competency of the independent BRSA.  
All these factors for the failure of the BRSA in Turkish context point out the 
significance of certain preconditions in constructing independent regulatory and 
supervisory agencies. This historical episode in the construction of Turkish BRSA 
over the last five years has important ramifications for the other developing countries 
which are likely to follow the similar procedures to establish independent regulatory 
and supervisory institutions for their financial markets.   
The paper is organized as follows. We first explain the Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP). In Section 3, IMF and the World Bank’s suggestions 
for financial sector regulatory and supervisory bodies (RSB) are presented. The paper 
also analyzes the independency of RSB as being a central issue of FSAP in Section 4. 
In analyzing the independency of RSB, we concentrate solely on separate and 
independent RSB, as opposed to regulatory and supervisory function performed by 
the central banks. The independency of Turkish BRSA is explored as a case study in 
Section 5. We discuss the institutional impediments for independent regulatory and 
supervisory institution in the Turkish context in Section 6. The conclusions of this 
paper which is presented in Section 7 can be generalized to other developing countries 
which confront with the comparable issues in establishing independent regulatory and 
supervisory authorities. 
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2. Overview of the Financial Sector Assessment Program 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) were created 
after Bretton Woods Conference in 1944. IMF was charged to maintain order in 
international monetary system and to help solving balance of payment problems of the 
member countries. The World Bank was also deliberated to promote economic 
development. The main purposes of these institutions have remained unchanged. Over 
time, however, their operations have expanded in accordance with the changing needs 
of the member countries.      
Currently, IMF has three main operations; surveillance, financial assistance 
and technical assistance. Surveillance today, arises to be the most important 
operations for IMF. Surveillance refers to maintain a dialogue with member countries 
on the national and international consequences of their economic and financial 
policies. IMF also provides financial assistance to member countries to rebuild their 
international reserves, to stabilize their currencies and to continue paying for imports 
without having to impose trade restrictions or capital controls. Finally, IMF provides 
technical assistance to member countries to contribute to the development of the 
productive resources of member countries by enhancing the effectiveness of economic 
policy and financial policy. 
The World Bank’s main purpose, at the moment, is defined as poverty 
reduction and enhancing the development prospects of member countries. Operations 
of the World Bank to improve the financial systems of member countries are also 
relevant in this paper in addition to the IMF activities related to the financial markets†. 
                                                 
† See Hilbers (2001) for the detailed description of IMF and the World Bank programs in financial 
structuring. 
 6
After increasing sequence of financial crises in emerging markets, both IMF 
and the World Bank have much more extensively concentrated on the financial 
markets of developing countries.  Prior to this increasing attention, the main concern 
for the IMF was to enhance macroeconomic stability. Hence, the detailed policy 
recommendations concerning the financial system were rare. In the 1980s and the 
beginning of 1990s, many countries liberalized their financial systems and a 
significant fraction of these countries experience twin crises in the subsequent years. 
Due to the experiences of crisis-ridden economies, IMF has concentrated more on the 
links between financial system soundness and macroeconomic stability (Fischer, 
2000). With liberalization and globalization of financial markets, weaknesses of 
financial system emerged as a vital issue especially considering contagious effects of 
recent financial crises. Many IMF and the World Bank member countries, both 
industrialized and developing, have experienced financial crises in 1980s and 1990s. 
The severity of financial crises has shown the importance of well-regulated financial 
markets especially the banking sector  in creating financial stability not just for 
individual countries but for the world economy as a whole (Onis & Aysan, 2000 and 
Conthe, 2001).  
After the financial crises of the late 1990s, IMF and the World Bank initiated 
Financial Sector Assessment Program to evaluate member countries’ financial 
markets. The main goal of this program is to help member countries enhance their 
resistance to financial crises and their contagious effects by promoting safety and 
soundness of financial markets. To this end, IMF and the World Bank aim to provide 
a sound framework for financial sector vulnerabilities and to improve the analysis of 
macroeconomic and financial stability issues, in addition to helping national financial 
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authorities to develop policy responses against the early indicators of financial 
distress. 
The FSAP program of IMF and the World Bank has three main components: 
 1-an assessment of stability of the financial system in an attempt to 
conceptualize the bidirectional relationship between macroeconomic factors and 
financial stability. 
 2-an assessment of the extent to which relevant financial sector standards, 
codes, and good practices are observed 
 3-an assessment of the financial sector’s reform and development needs  
 
The IMF and the World Bank employs certain tools and methodologies to 
determine these three assessments. Macro-prudential analysis concentrates on the link 
between macroeconomic performance and financial sector soundness and it benefits 
from stress test and scenario analysis. Standards, codes and observances aim to 
identify discrepancies in financial sector regulation and transparency practices of 
member countries and their potentially best practices. Reform and development needs 
are also covered by these standards (Hilbers, 2001). Currently, under this program, 
there are almost over 283 assessments of standards and codes. These standards consist 
of six main components as follows: 
i) IMF Code of Good Practices on Transparency in Monetary and Fiscal 
Policies 
ii)  Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP)  
iii) Core Principles for Systematically Important Payment Systems 
iv)  International Organization of Securities Commissions Objectives and 
Principles of Securities Regulation 
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v) International Association of Insurance Supervisors Insurance Core Principles,  
vi) Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendations for Anti-Money 
Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism.  
There are also some other guidelines to use under FSAP‡: i) the OECD 
Corporate Governance Principles; ii) World Bank Principles for Effective Insolvency 
and Creditors Rights; iii) CPSS-IOSCO Recommendations for Securities Settlement 
System (RSSS); and iv) International Accounting and Auditing Standards§.  
 
3. IMF and the World Bank’s Policy Recommendations for Regulatory and 
Supervisory Institutions 
 
 
3.1. A Background of the Recommended Policies 
Over the last twenty years, it has been a common trend for many developing 
countries to liberalize their economies. In retrospect, this period appears to be 
characterized with recurrent financial crises especially in the form of twin-crises. 
Many institutional and macroeconomic factors have played significant roles in the 
crises. However, banking sector problems have been always central in these crises 
(Mishkin, 2001).  Moreover, with the advent of new globalization wave in recent 
decades, national financial markets are much more integrated in global financial 
system. Hence, a financial crisis can easily and abruptly spread over the rest of the 
world and pose a great threat for the stability of global financial markets. Because of 
contagion effect, for example, providing financial system stability emerges to be the 
                                                 
‡ With respect to the independent regulatory authority issue, Basel Core Principles for Effective 
Banking Supervision (BCP) also set up certain standards for financial sector, especially for financial 
sector regulatory bodies. 
§ For detailed information about the characteristics of the FSAP program, one can check IMF, 2003. 
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main goal of the IMF and the World Bank’s policy recommendations for financial 
markets.  
As a result of these considerations, a new line of research both in international 
financial institutions and in academia focuses on deficiencies in financial markets and 
deduces new policy recommendations about the prudential regulation and supervision 
of financial systems (Rossi, 1999). The main objective of these suggestions is to 
reduce financial fragility and to provide financial stability. 
 
3.2. Policy Recommendations of International Organizations for Effective 
Regulatory and Supervisory Institutions 
  Mishkin (2001) categorizes policies to enhance financial stability under twelve 
sections**.  Central one related to this paper is prudential regulation of financial 
sector. Unless the prudential regulation is provided in financial markets, it is hard to 
prevent recurrent financial crises due to well-known moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems. Hence, many governments attempt to establish well-designed 
regulatory and supervisory system to sustain stable financial markets. There are 
several important elements that must be provided for the strong prudential supervision 
like prompt corrective action, prudent risk management, limiting too-big-to-fail, a 
statutory authority for prudential regulators/supervisors, accountability of supervisors 
and restriction on connected lending†† (Mishkin, 2001).  Moreover, both the IMF and 
                                                 
** These policies are prudential regulation, accounting and disclosure requirements, legal and judicial 
systems, market-based discipline, entry of foreign banks, capital controls, reduction of the role of state-
owned financial institutions, restriction on foreign-denominated debt, elimination of too-big-to-fail in 
the corporate sector, sequencing financial liberalization, monetary policy and price stability, exchange 
regimes and foreign exchange reserves (Mishkin, 2001, p.17) 
†† This paper especially focuses on importance of independence of regulatory/supervisory agencies by 
referring to Turkish experience in recent years. 
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the World Bank’s policy recommendations to developing countries evolve around the 
same idea for better prudential regulation and supervision.  
This theme also constitutes Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision. There are 25 basic principles in Basel Core Principles to create effective 
supervisory system‡‡. The first core principle consists of six sub-parts and utterly 
related to supervisory agencies. This principle deals with the definition of 
responsibilities and objectives for supervisory agency in addition to skills, resources, 
legal framework, enforcement powers, adequate legal protection for supervisors, and 
information sharing for an independent supervisory agency§§. 
 
 4. Independency of Regulatory and Supervisory Body: Whither Desirable or 
not? 
In this section, we analyze the merits of independence for regulatory and 
supervisory authorities.  The advocates of independent RSB point out that effective 
banking is merely achieved through an independent RSB. To this end, RSB needs to 
be sheltered against the political influence and unnecessary lawsuits. RSB needs to be 
equipped both with budgetary independence and operational independence. These 
remarks are quite often pronounced by international organizations to establish 
independent RSB. For example, the review of Bank of International Settlement*** in 
                                                 
‡‡ These principles are related to objectives, autonomy, powers and resources (1 core, 6 sub), licensing 
and structure (4 core), prudential regulations and requirements (10 core), methods of ongoing 
supervision (5 core), information requirements (1 core), remedial measures and exit (1 core), and cross-
border banking (3 core). 
§§ See the official web page of the Basel for details on core principles, www.bis.org. 
*** For the details of this review, check the web page of Bank of International Settlement at 
www.bis.org. 
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sixty countries highlights importance of independency of supervisory authorities 
among their three main results pertaining to be improved in these countries†††.  
The independency of RSB is also indispensable for prudential supervision. 
Existing literature on financial market crises shows that the lack of independent RSB 
leads to corporate weaknesses before the crises and further aggravates the severity of 
the financial crises like in East Asian crisis (Kaminsky & Reinhart, 1999; Calomoris 
& Beim, 2001). Political interference in the supervisory process generally appears “to 
sweep problems under the rug” and postpones the recognition of the severity of the 
crises and thereby delays an effective intervention to financial system (Quintyn & 
Taylor, 2002 and Mishkin, 2001).  
Establishment of an independent authority, as opposed to government agency, 
provides barriers for interference from the political arena and the financial sector. 
Moreover, Independent RSB enables to create a professional structure that exclusively 
concentrates on its own operations in regulating the financial markets. This 
specialized organization is more prone to solve complex issues. This independent 
body also improves transparency, public confidence and financial stability.  
There are two dimensions of independency of RSB. The first one is 
independence from political interference. The second one is less emphasized as 
compared to the first one. However, it is at least as important as the first one to 
maintain the independence of RSB. Then, the second one is the independence from 
the supervised entities like banks in the financial sector. The latter one can also be 
framed as freedom from “regulatory capture”. Because of the dominant role of the 
banks in emerging financial markets, they apply a notable pressure on RSB. In 
addition to the banks, some powerful companies connected to the banks tend to 
                                                 
††† For further evidence on the arguments of international organizations, one can also check  IMF and 
the World Bank, 2002. 
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increase their pressure especially when their interest is at stake before and after 
financial turmoils. These pressures are explicitly and implicitly reflected in the 
decisions of RSB. Given that these two types of pressures undermine the regulatory 
and supervisory roles in financial markets, independence from the interference of 
political and supervised entities appears to be a common consensus to accomplish 
better regulatory governance. 
There are however, certain drawbacks of having fully independent RSB. 
Extreme independence of RSB may not be desirable especially in democratic 
countries where politicians are elected for having certain policy objectives. Politicians 
are accountable for their political agenda whereas the RSB is not directly accountable 
to electorate and may deviate from the public opinion in exercising its independent 
authority. The power given to RSB is likely to create a principal agent problem when 
RSB has a different objective function than its principal (Das & Quintyn, 2002). 
Other adverse outcomes of independent RSB are associated with generating new 
institutional rigidities and imposing tight-regulations over the industry, which 
aggravates to the cost of doing business (Quintyn & Taylor, 2002). Given this 
considerations, the politicians do not want to create a “fourth branch of government” 
in addition to legislative, executive and judiciary branches 
In spite of some undesirable consequences of independent RSB, some recent 
papers provide alternative models to account for these negative factors (Majone, 
1993). Dialogue model for example, offers a new framework to reduce these negative 
factors. In this model, independent RSB does not act as an irresponsible or headless 
fourth branch but interact with political authorities in carrying out its regulatory and 
supervisory responsibilities. In Dialogue model, an independent RSB is subject to 
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self-imposed censor which gives the political authority an opportunity to 
communicate their political agenda to the RSB.  
Another solution for the harmful aspects of independent RSB is to provide 
well-defined principles for the functioning of independent RSB such that RSB does 
not exceed the boundaries of its authority. To this end, accountability of RSB needs to 
be established. This is a “sine qua non” principle for the independence because it 
enables RSB to justify its actions against its designated responsibilities. Another vital 
feature is transparency. Requirement for certain level of transparency limits RSB’s 
self-interested actions and provides checks on the RSB to pursue its predefined 
objectives. In addition to these features, integrity among RSB’s staffs needs to be 
provided in order to ensure that the RSB’s staffs can collectively pursue institutional 
goals (Das & Quintyn, 2002). Moreover, Abrams & Taylor (2000) emphasize that the 
objectives of RSB need to be defined clearly and the RSB needs to be equipped with 
adequate resources and effective enforcement powers along with the provision of 
legal protection for its actions.  
It is undeniably the case that many countries have made significant 
improvements for the independent RSB in recent decades. They have restructured 
regulatory and supervisory function under one roof. However, this process has been 
very thorny for many countries because of the political economy factors like strong 
status quo biases in governing the financial markets, conflicts among interest groups 
and politicians involved. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001a) analyze 107 countries and 
find out that developing countries display much lower scores as compared to 
developed countries. For example, independency of RSB reaches to its highest level 
in European Union countries whereas the South Asian countries display lower levels 
of RSB independence. 
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  To establish an independent RSB is not a single solution to prevent financial 
sector weaknesses and reduce financial instability. At the same time, financial system 
needs to be empowered by creating a well-designed legal environment. Furthermore, 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001b) show that the independence of RSB depends on a 
strong private sector monitoring, regulatory restrictions on bank activities and the 
level of moral hazard problem associated with deposit insurance policy. 
   
5. A Case of Independent RSB: Turkish BRSA   
5.1. Overview of IMF’s Policy Recommendations for Independent RSB in 
Turkey 
Turkey has adopted his first IMF program in 1958. Since then, Turkey has had 
periodic macroeconomic crises several times and implemented various IMF programs. 
IMF programs in Turkey are used to be concentrated on structural macroeconomic 
problems like budget deficits and high inflation (Alper, 2000; Alper et al. 2001; 
Akcay et al. 2001; Onis, 2003, Akcay, 2003). However, in recent IMF programs, the 
particular policy recommendations to cure weaknesses in Turkish financial markets 
have been central.  
Turkey has made a stand-by agreement with the IMF in December 1999 for a 
three-year period program‡‡‡. In this agreement, structural problems in banking 
system and restructuring of banking sector have emerged among the IMF priorities. 
With this new program, IMF has sought to create strong regulatory agency in Turkey. 
Before the stand-by agreement, in June 1999, Turkish parliament has approved a new 
banking law that has created a new supervision authority which is the Banking 
Regulation and Supervision Agency (BRSA). This new law has brought an end to 
                                                 
‡‡‡ The web page of Turkish Treasury provides a detailed account of various IMF programs in Turkey 
For further details about content of this program, one can check: www.treasury.gov.tr. 
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multiple duties played by the Turkish Treasury and Central Bank in regulating the 
financial markets in Turkey. 
In the Turkey’s letter of intent dated December 9, 1999 to the IMF, 
strengthening the banking system and banking regulation is listed as an important 
benchmark for structural reforms. According to this letter of intent, The Banks Act 
would be amended to redesign the banking supervision structure on a proper 
foundation in order to increase transparency and independence in the operation of 
BRSA. This letter represents the intentions of Turkey to strengthen key prudential 
regulations and to provide all of the tools needed for the improved resolution of 
troubled banks.  
The BRSA is deliberated to be fully autonomous by removing the involvement 
of the Council of Ministers from all decisions in the area of supervision, other than the 
appointments of the members of the Board. The Banks Act has also been amended to 
strengthen the prudential standards for the bank lending to owners and to single or 
related parties.   
 
5.2. Establishment and Restructuring of BRSA 
The BRSA has legally taken on all responsibilities granted to it by the 
Banking Law approved in June 1999 and become fully operational as of end-August 
2000. Banking evaluation and supervision departments at the Treasury and the 
monitoring department at the Central Bank have been closed and their staff has been 
transferred to the new agency, including staff of the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund 
(SDIF), which has now become a legal entity administered by the BRSA. Some staffs 
have been transferred from the Ministry of Finance and the State Planning 
Organization.  Finally, some additional required staffs have been hired. An Asset 
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Management Unit (AMU), in charge of recovering the value of the assets of the banks 
taken over by the SDIF, was also set up to execute an efficient management of assets 
transferred to the SDIF. With this new structure, the BRSA monitors the conditions of 
all banks through off-site analysis of bank balance sheets and income reports and 
through on-site examinations.  
This IMF-led economic reform program of Turkey had two main goals: 
defeating the chronic and persistent high inflation of the 1990s, and overcoming the 
associated macroeconomic instability, which had constrained economic growth 
throughout the 1990s. During the original three-year program initiated in December 
1999, Turkey has reformed the banking sector through an operational and financial 
restructuring of public banks, and by strengthening the regulation and supervision of 
private banks. However, the actual reason behind this success is attributable to last 
two financial crises of Turkey in November 2000 and February 2001. Crisis-ridden 
Turkish economy has taken major steps in reforming the financial system. In this 
respect, Turkish experience after the crises arises as a proper example for the 
arguments that crises induce economic reforms (Alesina & Drazen, 1991; Easterly  & 
Drazen, 2001). 
 At the end of original three-year program initiated in December 1999, Turkey 
and IMF have signed another stand-by agreement in January 2002. In the letter of 
intent dated January 18, 2002, Turkey stresses that the program aims to continue the 
strengthening of the banking system and its supervision structure that has been 
underway since 1999. Turkey also expresses his commitment to improve prudential 
regulation and supervision even further. 
Draft legislation related to strengthening the effectiveness of BRSA has been 
submitted to Parliament but did not pass by the end of October 2003. This legislation 
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has been constituting an essential structural performance criterion for the IMF 
program. The Turkish government states that this legislation is expected to be passed 
shortly and certainly before the IMF board’s consideration of the sixth program target 
for net international reserves by more than US$7 billion. Moreover, to maintain the 
BRSA’s independence, the Turkish Government enabled for the direct submission of 
the BRSA budget to Parliament under the new law for independent agencies in 
Turkey. The Turkish Government has also been taking other necessary measures to 
reform the banking system and to strengthen the supervisory framework. Another 
legislation designed by the government, for example, enables the transfer of 
regulation and supervision of non-bank credit institutions from the Treasury to the 
BRSA. 
Turkey has submitted last letter of intent to IMF on April 2, 2004. According 
to this letter, by the end-April Turkey completes the review of the Banking Act and 
prepares draft amendments to strengthen the Banking Act in line with EU standards. 
Areas that receive particular attention include: (a) proper criteria for on-site 
inspections; (b) legal protection of BRSA and SDIF staffs for actions taken during the 
course of their duties; and (c) delineation of responsibilities between BRSA and 
SDIF. The separation of the Boards of the SDIF and BRSA has been completed. This 
separation facilitates asset recovery and allows greater concentration by the BRSA on 
its supervisory responsibilities.  
The recent experiences of BRSA have revealed that the banking supervision 
and regulation in practice is much more complex than issuing laws to establish 
regulatory and supervisory institutions. In Turkish context, private lobbies were 
resistant to any types of regulations in Turkish financial sector. They pressured the 
newly founded organization not to deviate from status-quo. The politicians and policy 
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makers were not very enthusiastic for the independent BRSA to function in Turkey 
considering that they perceived private banks as a major mean of government 
financing and the public banks to sustain their electoral support. As a result, IMF’s 
efforts to design a new institution without internalizing the political and institutional 
problems in the construction of an autonomous and effective regulatory institution 
turn to a complete failure. Onis (2003), Alper & Onis (2003a-b) emphasize this aspect 
of financial system reforms in Turkey. Alper & Onis (2003a-b) denote the problems 
in engineering reforms in a top-down fashion while disregarding political legitimacy 
needed for effective implementation of the IMF sponsored reform programs. In the 
next section, we analyze the performance of the Turkish BRSA in detail. 
 
6. Analysis of the Turkish BRSA’s Independency 
Turkish BRSA has been founded according to IMF and WB suggestions as an 
independent institution. Nevertheless, it has not had an appropriate organizational 
structure and legal framework to work effectively and efficiently from September 
2000 to now. There are many internal and external factors underlying for this 
unsuccessful performance. The essential requirement is then to uncover of these 
factors that cause the BRSA to fail. This analysis will form a reference for subsequent 
countries that follow the IMF and WB policy recommendations. The analysis of this 
topic in Turkish context also portrays a new direction for these international financial 
institutions to modify their suggestions so as to get better outcomes from cross-
country applications. Hence, we analyze fundamental reasons for the unsuccessful 
performance of the BRSA below. Some of these are macro factors because they can 
not be solved solely by the BRSA. On the other hand, micro factors are related to the 
structuring of BRSA and easier to tackle for the effective functioning of BRSA. 
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 6.1. Status-Quo Bias in Turkish Administrative Structure 
  In spite of decentralization efforts after 1980s, organizational structure of 
Turkish government is still highly centralized. Centralized bureaucratic system has 
long historical path dependence in Turkish context. As a result of this general 
convention, until recent years, independent agencies within the government have not 
been very prevalent organizational forms in Turkey. The first independent authority, 
Insurance Supervisory Board, was established for supervising private insurance 
companies in 1959. Capital Market Board (1981), Radio and Television Supreme 
Council (1994), Turkish Competition Authority (1994), Consumer’s Council and the 
Arbitration Council for Consumer Problems (1995) and the Banking Regulation and 
Supervision Agency (1999) are established by law as independent authorities within 
the government to monitor the activities of governments. Currently, there are also 
numerous other independent regulatory authorities that were activated for regulating 
and supervising various markets such as tobacco, energy, telecommunication markets. 
(Activeline, November 2004). Overall, it is apparent in the Turkish context that 
momentum toward independent regulatory authorities was triggered by the financial 
crises and the subsequent efforts of international institutions rather than by the 
increasing public awareness and the resulting political actions.  
Even though some other branches of government have restructured as 
independent authorities similar to Turkish BRSA, they have not generated vivid 
policy discussions. This intensity of discussion on the independence of Turkish BRSA 
stems from the fact that banks have a significant power in Turkish political arena in 
addition to being dominant players in Turkish financial system. This reason also 
explains why the IMF and the World Bank are so insistent in creating an independent 
authority for supervising and regulating the banking sector. 
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Highly centralized government structure does not easily accept transferring 
power to an independent and decentralized financial authority. For example, in the 
new Banking Law, the timing of establishment of BRSA was set to be in June 1999. 
However, the BRSA could not become operational on a specified date. Threefold 
coalition government constituted a main reason for this delay. The coalition 
government did not reach a conclusion in appointing the Board of directors for the 
BRSA that were consisted of one president and six members. The process has been 
delayed in spite of endemic problems in the Turkish banking sector such as connected 
lending and extreme moral hazard. Hence, it was clear that the coalition government 
was not ready to deviate from the existing organizational structure in governing the 
Turkish financial system. 
Another example for the resistance of conventional governance in this context 
can be seen in the intensity and severity of destructive criticisms for the newly 
established organization. Although the BRSA is a relatively young institution, it 
received an intense criticism against its activities from media, powerful interest 
groups, and other institutions within the government and even sometimes from the 
government which initiated the establishment of independent BRSA.  These severe 
criticisms actually disclose some clues that the conventional governmental system in 
Turkey is not very much willing to lose power against an independent authority in the 
financial system. Figure 1 portrays the performance of existing governance structure 
in Turkey from a comparative perspective. It also displays the level of private credit 
provided by domestic banks as a standard indicator of level of financial development.  
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Figure 1. Quality of Governace and Financial Development: A 
Comparative Perspective 
Source: Authors' calculations from International Country Risk Guide, Governance Matter 
III, Kaufmann et al. and Financial Data Set of Demirguc-Kunt et al.
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6.2. Concentration Issue: The Dominant Role of Public Banks in Turkish 
Banking Sector  
Turkish banking sector is characterized with two main inherent issues. First, 
the state-owned banks (mainly three banks) allocate a significant fraction of total 
financial assets in Turkey. Table 1 reports the concentration ratio in Turkish banking 
sector. Although, the share of the state-owned banks has declined in last fifteen years, 
from 45 percent to 33 percent, the state-owned banks still have a prominent asset 
share and dominant role in the banking sector. In 1999, Turkish government initiated 
a banking restructuring program in line with the policy recommendations of IMF. In 
this restructuring program, reorganization of the state-owned banks emerged as the 
major piece of the program. In spite of a considerable decline in the share of state-
owned banks, currently the share becomes stable at 32-33 percent level.  
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Despite the reduction in the share of state-owned banks in the banking sector, 
the state-owned banks still control one third of the total banking sector assets. This 
dominance of government banks reduces the effectiveness and independence of 
BRSA. Given that government appoints the managers of both the banks and the 
BRSA, conflict of interest occurs when the BRSA make a decision over the state-
owned banks while acting independently.  
1990 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004(June)
Public 45 35 34 33 33 33 33
Private 44 49 46 55 56 57 57
Foreign 3 5 7 3 3 3 3
Under SDIF Management - 6 9 5 4 3 3
Total of Commercial 
Banks(Depository)
93 95 96 96 96 96 96
Development and 
Investmet Banks 
(Nondepository)
8 5 4 4 4 4 4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
First Five Banks 54 46 48 56 58 60 60
First Ten Banks 75 68 69 80 81 82 82
First Five Private Banks - - 33 - 44 45 44
Table-1
The Concentration and Dominance in Turkish Banking Sector 
Source: Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, Annual Reports 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003; Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency,
Banking Sector Development Report, October 2004; Turkish Bankers Association, Banks in Turkey 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003  
 
Second problem in Turkish banking sector is again related to concentration 
issue. Aside from the state-owned banks, only a few private banks remain dominant in 
the Turkish banking sector as it is evident from the last row of Table 2. This factor 
also affects the BRSA’s effectiveness and its independency. As discussed previously 
in this paper, existing research come to the conclusion that the independence from 
industry is the main requirement for the independent RSA. Since there is a positive 
relationship between the political power and the interest of the big banks at stake, it is 
more likely that big banks exert more efforts to influence the politicians when RSA 
acts independently. Moreover, big banks suffer less from the collective action 
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problem (Olson, 1965). This high concentration of handful of private banks has 
adverse consequences to fulfill the independency of BRSA in practice.  
Another reason that may restrict the BRSA’s actions to regulate the banking 
sector with high concentration ratio stems from the “too big to fail hypothesis”. This 
problem is valid both for the big private and the state-owned banks. When these banks 
have certain difficulties, the BRSA may be constrained in giving sound decisions 
while considering the negative impacts of its decisions on the stability of financial 
markets as a whole. 
The Pamukbank case represents a typical example for this problem. Although 
this bank lost its financial strength for a long time, both the banking authority and the 
BRSA did not take any actions against the Pamukbank (BRSA 2002). Moreover, the 
BRSA delayed the decision to transfer the bank’s management to the SDIF. However, 
the same problems are likely to recur considering the structural deficit of high 
concentration of few public and private banks in the Turkish banking sector. 
 
6.3. Employees Groups with Conflicting Backgrounds 
Before the establishment of the BRSA, monitoring, evaluating and supervising 
activities of banking sector were carried out by the Treasury Department and Central 
Bank. Treasury Department had the responsibility to inspect the banking sector with 
its on-site examiners and the evaluation results were also applied by banking division. 
On the other hand, the Turkish Central Bank was required to monitor the banking 
system by its monitoring division. These two main functions were unified under the 
BRSA umbrella according to the new Banking Law in 1999.  
During the establishment process, however, in addition to these branches of 
the Treasury and the Central Bank, different personnel groups who had worked at 
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various departments of Turkish government were also transferred to the BRSA from 
State Planning Organization, Ministry of Finance and from other institutions (Figure 
2). Naturally, there were important differences in organizational backgrounds of these 
highly diverse groups of employees. In certain cases, some of the transferred 
employees were not even related to the banking sector, especially at the upper levels. 
As a result, the BRSA of Turkey have confronted with difficulties in coordinating its 
workforce and hence failed to run various divisions efficiently. This issue also affects 
the BRSA’s budget independency in practice. We explain this issue in details later in 
the paper.  
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Figure 2: Organizational Chart of the BRSA 
(When Established) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BRSA, Annual Report of 2000.  
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6.4. Accountability and Transparency Problems 
  The BRSA has been proposed and founded as an independent agency 
according to the Banking Act of 4389. The main organizational structure of BRSA 
was also designated in this Act. Although there were many small details emphasized 
in this Act, accountability and transparency issues of the BRSA are not well defined. 
For example, the legal consequences of its decision in the national law system are left 
unanswered. Moreover, a final authority that the BRSA is liable to for its operation 
such as the Turkish Parliament or Prime Minister is not explicitly mentioned in this 
Act. However, these issues are essential for the accountability and transparency of the 
BRSA. 
 Even though the BRSA is an independent regulatory and supervisory agency, 
its decisions may be vulnerable to populist dissent when the BRSA decides to transfer 
a bank’s management to the SDIF or to cancel a bank’s license. However, when the 
accountability and transparency issues are defined better, the BRSA perform its duties 
within a well-defined boundary rather than on the basis of ad hoc assumptions about 
its domain. This critical point has generated substantial inconsistency over the last 
five years and will continue to do that unless the accountability and transparency of 
BRSA are improved. For example, since accountability and transparency issues have 
not been determined well by the Banking Act today, the decisions of BRSA with 
respect to the transferring of banks to the SDIF were interrogated by both the Turkish 
Parliament and Prime Ministry.  
The Kentbank and Demirbank cases illustrate this idea even more explicitly. 
The managements of these banks were relegated to the SDIF with a decision of BRSA 
during 2000-2001 financial crises. Subsequently, the main shareholders of these banks 
brought their case to the Turkish courts to revoke the BRSA’s decision and to get the 
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managements of their banks back. After a long time, the main shareholders of these 
banks won their trials and thereby obtained the right to get their banks back. However, 
in the meantime, the SDIF sold the Demirbank to HSBC Group and decided to 
liquidate the Kentbank. Similar problems were also experienced in Türkbank and 
Tarişbank cases after these banks were transferred to the SDIF in 1997 and 2001 
respectively (see SDIF, Annual Reports 2001, 2002, 2003).   
The decisions of BRSA have turned out to be irreversible in practice given 
that the final status of these banks has also been accepted by the Turkish courts. 
However, this de facto resolution has generated a great confusion and complexity in 
the Turkish financial markets and increased the suspicion about the basic activities of 
BRSA. Ability to bring a law suit against the BRSA is a good indicator for the just 
law system. However, considering the characteristics of the banking sector in Turkey, 
the court’s decision created more issues for the Turkish banking system rather than 
delivering justice. Because of these reasons, the legal framework for the BRSA must 
be determined and justified well. Otherwise, the independency without accountability 
and transparency exacerbates irregularities even more in the financial markets. 
 
6.5. Budget Independency Problem 
 The budget independency constitutes one of the essential contributing factors 
for independency of RSB. The banking act for the establishment of BRSA states that 
the BRSA affords its expenses from funds provided by the Turkish banks depending 
on their balance sheet total in the preceding year (Article 6 of Banks Act No: 4389; 
Article 101 of the New Banking Act No:5411). Hence, the BRSA has budget 
independency that was rendered with the latest banking law (BRSA 2001). However, 
pressure groups inside and outside the BRSA prevented this agency to realize budget 
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independence in practice. Currently, BRSA operates with standard budget procedures 
similar to other branches of Turkish government. This lack of independent budgetary 
procedure in practice undermines the primary objective of independent BRSA.  
 The internal resistance comes from the some departments that have the right to 
make expenditures of the Agency. As it is seen the Figure 2, the personnel of these 
departments and their vice president, also the first chairman of BRSA, came from the 
Ministry of Finance. They brought their organizational structure to the BRSA. As a 
result, application rules of BRSA’s budget took a shape closer to the general budget 
rules. Hence, the organizational backgrounds of these employees harmed the budget 
independency of BRSA.  
 At the outside of BRSA, as a part of general resistance for the independent 
agency, the budget of BRSA and its financial facilities are reported with 
exaggerations by other governmental departments and the mass media. In reality, 
however, the BRSA had just enough budgets to operate its functions regularly. 
Moreover, on the contrary to general false impression, the BRSA does not even 
provide an adequate amount of compensation to its qualified staffs commensurate to 
the banking sector average. This point is also pointed out in various Letters of Intents 
given to IMF. In addition to this, salaries of top managers are also low as compared to 
their responsibilities.  
 Lastly, the current government attempts to reorganize all independent 
regulatory and supervisory authorities. This amendment proposes the salaries of the 
top managements and personnel to correspond to a certain proportion of the salary of 
the Undersecretary of Prime Minister regardless of the importance of the agency. 
Moreover, another pressure comes for its revenues such that the governments can 
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transfer some portion of BRSA’s revenues to the general budget. These proposals are 
likely to deteriorate the independence of BRSA even further§§§.   
 
6.6. Restrictions on the BRSA’s Board Members 
 BRSA's board consists of seven members, including a chairman and second 
chairman. The Banking Act of 4389 brought some requirements related to educational 
and professional background to be a member in the board. In addition to these general 
requirements, there are some specific restrictions on the members of the board which 
are likely to create problems. The current Banking Act does not allow the board 
members to work at a financial institution for a specified period of time after their 
duties as board members are terminated. This constraint makes it more difficult to 
appoint professionals from the Turkish financial sector. Hence, the retired bankers, 
government bureaucrats and politicians are appointed in spite of their lack of 
capability and/or expertise in the banking sector. The lack of enough compensation 
mentioned in the previous section also inhibits the BRSA to hire competent 
professionals for its board.  
 Although the Banking Act prohibits working at the financial sector after 
leaving the board, it does not restrict the old board members to be active politicians. 
However, the incentive to engage in political activities harms the independency of the 
board’s members and makes them more vulnerable to political pressures. Hence, one 
needs to think of the independence of BRSA as a dynamic process and takes into 
account how the expected political gains of the board members affect their current 
decisions. 
                                                 
§§§ This proposal has been incorporated in the new Banking Act in November 2005. 
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 Related to this issue, some members, especially chairman and second 
chairman, may use these positions as a stepping stone to participate in politics. Hence, 
with this motivation at the background, they are more likely to adopt populist policies 
and to make certain hidden investments for their own political careers. The recent 
Turkish experience offers a plenty of evidence for this case in last five years.  
  Finally, we want to point out a different aspect of independence which is 
crucial in the Turkish context.  In addition to independence from the political 
interference and from the supervised entities, the regulatory and supervisory body 
needs to be independent from the pressures of international financial authorities. In 
the Turkish case, the international institutions emerge as other actors in shaping the 
domestic policies; when the bureaucrats in the independent authorities opt to form 
coalitions with the international institutions against the nationally elected 
governments to implement their preferred economic policies.  
 These examples illustrate that independency highly depends on the incentive 
system given to the board members. It is definitely reasonable to prohibit old board 
members to work at the financial institutions in an attempt to reduce regulatory 
capture. However, certain provisions and securities for the board members need to be 
provided to compensate their future losses especially considering that in the current 
context, only the political options seem to be accessible for the board members****. 
 
6.7. Insufficient Regulatory Forbearance 
The rule of law has a vital importance for the independence of regulatory and 
supervisory authority. After 1980s, the financial system of Turkey has been 
liberalized and many restrictions have been eliminated such as interest rate ceilings 
                                                 
**** Fortunately, there exist some improvements in the new Banking Act in November 2005. 
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and certain banking service regulations. However, the current law system has not been 
improved to accommodate the changing needs and circumstances of the Turkish 
financial system. Although governments have made piecemeal changes in the 
Banking Acts, the current financial laws are still lacking in providing a solid 
foundation for the healthy operations of the Turkish financial system.  
 The recent experience of Turkey shows it once again that when the regulatory 
forbearance is insufficient, the regulations intended for the banking crimes are not 
really deterring.  The legal infrastructure is not supportive and coherent with the 
BRSA’s regulations. In Turkey, despite the existence of strict laws governing the 
banking crimes, there are difficulties in actually implementing these laws.  For 
example, many preventive rulings have been given against the connected lending and 
looting issues. Moreover, managements of more than twenty banks have been 
transferred to the SDIF. Currently, most of these cases are pending trials at the 
Turkish courts, because the trial process lasts so long in Turkey. As a result of this 
sluggish functioning of Turkish courts, nobody in these trials has yet been sentenced 
on the basis of the connected and looting lending. 
Another problem arises due the inconsistency between the private law 
governing the financial institutions and the general law. Turkey does not have law 
courts specialized in the financial issues. Hence, any decision given by the BRSA on 
banking sector issues is easily nullified by a general court. This lack of coherence 
leads to even less regulatory forbearance and impairs the functioning of independent 
BRSA in Turkey.       
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Figure 3. Quality of Rule of Law: A Comparative Perspective
Source: Authors' calculations from International Country Risk Guide, Governance Matter 
III, Kaufmann et al. 
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6.8. Conflicting Policy Recommendations by International Financial Institutions 
International financial institutions encourage countries to have independent 
RSB. However, some of the policy recommendations of these institutions contain 
substantial internal conflicts and inconsistencies. Strict IMF policy requirements and 
targets as a part of stabilization programs after the crises in Turkey constrain the 
flexibility and capability of BRSA. For example, strict policy targets of the Turkish 
Central Bank which are supported by the IMF have led the Demirbank to be insolvent 
as a result of rational panics during the crises and subsequently, exacerbated the 
severity of Turkish crisis in 2001.   
The Turkish governments have relied heavily on the domestic banks to 
rollover the domestic debt throughout the 1990s. The Demirbank was the major 
player in this domestic lending process. Even though its majority of assets consisted 
of the Turkish Treasury bonds, the Demirbank could not liquidate bonds to meet its 
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financial liabilities during the 2001 financial crisis. The central issue was to fulfill the 
requirement of IMF for the “net domestic assets” of the Turkish Central Bank. This 
constraint invalidated “the lender of last resort” responsibility of the Turkish Central 
Bank.  This case illustrated the third type of independence which is the independence 
from the pressures of international organizations especially when the national interest 
clashes with the policy recommendations of the international institutions. This case 
further uncovers the need for coherent but flexible policy recommendations by the 
international organizations.    
 
6.9. Public Pressure on the BRSA’s Tough Decisions 
 After the recent Turkish crises, the BRSA took over the insolvent banks. 
Some of the banks are closed and others are reorganized and merged under several 
banks. As a consequence of this restructuring, many people have lost their jobs over 
the last five years (see Table 2). This social dimension of crises generated an intense 
public pressure against the activities of BRSA.  This pressure is also supported by the 
politicians to redirect the public discontent to a tangible organization. However, the 
outcomes of BRSA’s actions and decisions deteriorated the popularity of last coalition 
government. Finally, this government, not surprisingly, lost the national election.  
In retrospect, the coalition government seems to bear the burden of adverse 
effects of the BRSA’s decisions on society. However, in reality, a policy approach to 
sweep the banking sector problems under rug has come to the end with the increasing 
awareness led by the sudden stop associated with crises in Turkey. With respect to the 
independence of BRSA, recent Turkish experience shows that the decisions of 
independent authority are also influenced by the social concerns.  Prospective public 
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pressure against the unpopular policies of the BRSA is only alleviated when it is made 
clear to whom the BRSA is accountable in the Turkish governmental organization.   
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004(June)
Public 71.801 70.191 56.108 40.158 37.994 37.231
Private 75.518 70.954 64.380 66.869 70.614 73.722
Foreign 4.782 3.805 5.395 5.416 5.481 5.553
Under SDIF Management 15.975 19.895 6.391 5.886 4.518 4.277
Total of Commercial 
Banks(Depository)
168.076 164.845 132.274 118.329 118.607 120.783
Development and 
Investment Banks (Non-
depository)
5.836 5.556 5.221 4.942 4.642 5.491
Total 173.912 170.401 137.495 123.271 123.249 126.274
The Number of Employees in Turkish Banking Sector (1999-2004) 
Source: Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, Annual Report 2001; Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency,
Banking Sector Development Report, October 2004; Turkish Bankers Association, Banks in Turkey 2003
Table-2
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 Globalized financial markets appear to be vulnerable to crises more than ever 
before. The experiences of developing countries in the recent decades confirm that 
well-functioning financial markets require constant monitoring and sound regulation 
of financial markets. Even though we do not observe discrete steps to improve the 
stability of international financial markets, there are significant attempts to fix the 
deficiencies in domestic financial markets of individual countries. Efforts to establish 
independent regulatory and supervisory agencies across the countries are notable in 
this direction. International institutions like the IMF and the World Bank also play a 
significant role in setting up these independent regulatory authorities in various 
countries. The loan conditionality of IMF accelerates the institutional reform process 
of many countries in adopting the independent authorities to regulate their financial 
systems. Turkish case stands one of the recent examples for this IMF-led institutional 
change to construct an independent regulatory and supervisory authority for the 
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Turkish banking sector. The Turkish experience in the construction of this 
independent authority provides a novel perspective for the failure of engineering an 
institutional restructuring in a top-down manner without accounting for the 
preconditions for the successful institution reform. 
 This paper investigates the reasons for the failure of Turkish BRSA to function 
effectively over the last five years. Status-quo bias in Turkish administrative structure 
and high concentration ratio of state-owned banks as well as the few private banks 
prevent the BRSA to reach to its desired level of independence in its decision making 
process. Different employee groups with conflicting backgrounds also reduces the 
efficiency of the BRSA. This factor also contributes to the lack of budgetary 
independence for the BRSA which is necessary to achieve some level of 
independence to reduce the political and special interest group pressures. We also 
illustrate that strict restrictions on the BRSA’s board members open a new avenue for 
even more political intervention on the actions of the BRSA. Moreover, the 
accountability and transparency of BRSA need to be defined better. Current structure 
seems to be giving complete authority to the BRSA in its regulatory and supervisory 
responsibilities. However, this unlimited responsibility generates even more hesitant 
policy decisions by the BRSA. This lack of well-defined boundaries in exercising the 
power of BRSA leads the public to be more skeptical about the resolutions of BRSA. 
Some of the factors for the failure of BRSA in effectively delivering its 
responsibilities are related to macro factors which are outside the control of BRSA. 
For example, insufficient regulatory forbearance is a general problem of governance 
in Turkey. Finally, Turkish example offers a rather fitting example for the failure of 
IMF in providing consistent and flexible policy recommendations. This factor has also 
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contributed to the failure of BRSA in providing competent and effective regulatory 
and supervisory framework after the recent crises in Turkey.  
 Since preconditions are not well explored prior to giving certain policy 
recommendations, the Turkish BRSA, at this moment, has to indulge in inefficient 
activities and spend its most precious time to sustain its independency instead of 
focusing on regulating and supervising the Turkish banking sector. The Turkish 
experience reveals that in developing countries like Turkey, before legally founding a 
regulatory and supervisory agency, the international financial organizations need to 
focus on certain prerequisites and need to provide convenient environment for these 
agencies to operate. Otherwise, independent regulatory and supervisory institutions 
fall short of implementing their duties efficiently and effectively.  
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